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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-UNBORN CHILD-The
Estate of an Unborn Child Has a Cause of Action for
Wrongful Death-O'Neill v. Morse*
Mrs. Carol Pinet, eight months pregnant, was struck by an automobile; she and her unborn son were injured. The child was later
stillborn. An administrator for his estate brought suit against the two
drivers involved under the Michigan ·wrongful death act then in
force. 1 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants
on the ground that an unborn child was not a "person" in terms of
the act. 2 This ruling was supported by Estate of Powers v. City of
Troy,8 in which the Michigan supreme court had held that statutory
reference to the wrongful "death of a person" meant "person" in the
ordinary sense of the word when the act was first written in 1848,
and did not include the concept of a fetal child.4 In appealing the
decision, plaintiff O'Neill argued that such a holding deprived the
unborn child of due process and equal protection under both the
United States and Michigan Constitutions. 0 The appellate court af• 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971).
I. 385 Mich. at 132, 188 N.W.2d at 785. The applicable Michigan wrongful death
act, MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. § 600.2922 (1968), as amended, Pub. Act No. 65, [1971]
West's Mich. Legis. Serv. 111-12, provided in part:
(1) Liability of tort-feasor. Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting
in death shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or
default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured
to maintain an action and recover damages, in respect thereof, then and in every
such case, the person who, or the corporation which would have been liable, if
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as amount in law to felony. All actions for such death,
or injuries resulting in death, shall be brought only under this section.
(2) Persons entitled to sue; damages, distribution. Every such action shall be
brought by, and in the names of, the personal representatives of such deceased
person, and in every such action the court or jury may give such damages, as, the
court or jury, shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury
resulting from such death, to those persons who may be entitled to such damages
when recovered and also damages for the reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and
burial expenses for which the estate is liable and reasonable compensation for the
pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by such deceased person during the
period intervening between the time of the inflicting of such injuries and his death.
Such person or persons entitled to such damages shall be of that class who, by law,
would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the deceased had he died
intestate.•••
For a discussion of the 1971 amendment, see text accompanying note 112 infra.
2. The facts and prior history of the case can be found in the opinion of the appellate court, 20 Mich. App. 679,681,174 N.W.2d 575,576 (1969).
3. 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 530 (196'8), overruled by O'Neill y. Morse, 385 Mich.
130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971).
4. 380 Mich. at 170, 156 N .W.2d at 532.
5. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § I; MICH, CoNsr. art. I, §§ 2, 17. Cf. Omo CoNsr. art. 1,
§ 16 ("All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law ••••"), which has
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firmed the dismissal, inferring from Powers that like the statute,
neither Constitution included unborn children as "persons."° From
this holding, further appeal was taken to the Michigan supreme
court.
Before O'Neill was decided, however, the Michigan high court
had already made a fundamental revision of its attitude toward prenatal torts. Michigan had been one of the few jurisdictions still adhering to the view originally expressed in Dietrich v. Northampton, 7
followed in Michigan in Newman v. City of DetroU,8 that no person,
even if he survived birth, had an action at common law for prenatal
injuries. This was the position of the overwhelming majority of the
courts that had considered the issue at the time Newman was decided
in 1937.9 Only two years later this position began to erode, with
Califomia10 and the District of Columbia11 leading what was soon to
become a popular trend.12 The opportunity to overrule Newman
came last year with Womack v. Buchhorn,18 a common-law negligence
been held to include an unborn child as a "person." Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
6. 20 Mich. App. at 681, 174 N.W.2d at 576.
7. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). In Dietrich, the child was born when the mother was injured
in her fourth month of pregnancy, and there was testimony that the child had lived
for a few moments before death. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether
there was live birth, but it did note that the infant was "too little advanced in foetal
life to survive its premature birth." 138 Mass. at 15.
8. 281 Mich. 60, 63, 274 N.W. 710, 711 (1937), overruled by Womack v. Buchhorn,
384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
9. The following cases relied upon by Newman (281 Mich. at 63-64, 274 N.W. at 711)
have since been overruled: Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900),
overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Buel v. United Ry.,
248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913), overruled by Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258
S.W.2d 577 (1953); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), overruled by
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169,
49 A. 704 (1901), overruled by Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A,2d 222 (1966); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935), overruled by
Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand &: Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967); Lipps v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. &: Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916), overruled by Kwaterski v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967). The authority
of Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), although it has not been technically
overruled, has been seriously eroded. See, e.g., Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340
Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960). See also note 16 infra and accompanying text.
10. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P .2d 678, appeal denied, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 640, 93 P.2d 562 (1939), relying in part on what is now CAL. CIV. CODE § 29
(West 1970), which provides: "A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an
existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent
birth ••••"
11. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
12. See generally F. HAlu>ER &: F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.3 (Supp. 1968);
W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971); Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63
MICH. L. REv. 579 (1965). Prosser states at 336 that the retreat from the Dietrich posi•
tion was "up till that time the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule
in the whole history of the law of torts."
13. 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
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action brought on behalf of an eight-year old surviving child for
brain injuries suffered in an automobile accident during the fourth
month of his mother's pregnancy.14 In a unanimous opinion reversing
a summary judgment for the defendant, the Michigan supreme
court relied primarily on the almost total shift in the position of the
common law as interpreted in other jurisdictions,15 including the
reversal of all but two of. the cases cited by N ewman. 16 Determining
that the duty to re-examine questions of common law overrode the
principle of stare decisis, the court adopted the reasoning and result
of Smith v. Brennan11 that " 'justice requires ... that a child has a
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body.' " 18 The court
limited its holding in Womack to the prenatal injury of a surviving
child in a negligence action given by common law, but the overruling
of Newman opened the way for the court to look at the possibility of
a statutory action for the ·wrongful death of an unborn child.
In a five-to-two decision, the O'Neill court held that there was a
cause of action for the unborn child wrongfully killed, overruling
Powers on indistinguishable facts. The majority perceived in the
·wrongful death act a purpose to provide an action for death "whenever, if death had not ensued, there would have been an action for
damages," 19 and found the statutory wrongful death action "co-extensive with the common law right of action for damages." 20 Since
Womack provided an action for damages, it would be anomalous not
to allow an action for prenatal ·wrongful death.
That rationale, as a matter of statutory construction, might have
disposed of the case. But the reasoning of Powers, and a point strongly
urged by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in O'Neill,21 was
that the legislature did not use "person" to include an unborn child,
and since the ·wrongful death action is created by statute, there could
14. An earlier decision, LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960),
allowing a posthumous child to sue under the dramshop act for the death of his father,
had cast doubt on the vitality of Newman. The court had also been invited to reconsider Newman in Powers, but declined, limiting express discussion in the latter case to
whether an unborn child was a "person" in terms of the statute. Nevertheless, two
concurring justices (Brennan, J., 380 Mich. at 171, 156 N.W.2d at 533, and Souris, J.,
380 Mich. at 176, 156 N.W.2d at 535) as well as the dissent (T. M. Kavanagh, J., 380
Mich. at 185, 156 N.W.2d at 545) indicated that Newman might be overruled in an
appropriate case. Powers, inasmuch as it involved a statutory cause of action rather
than one at common law, was felt to be an appropriate case only by the dissent.
15. 384 Mich. at 720-23, 187 N.W.2d at 220-22, thoroughly reviewing authorities to
date. See authorities cited in note 12 supra.
16. See note 9 supra. Still standing are Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214
Ala. 611, 108 S. 56'6 (1926), and Walker v. Great N. Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Ireland 1891).
17. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
18. 384 Mich. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222, quoting 31 N.J. at 364, 157 A.2d at 503.
19. 385 Mich. at 133, 188 N.W.2d at 786 (emphasis original).
20. 385 Mich. at 134, 188 N .W.2d at 786.
21. 385 Mich. at 139, 144-46, 149-50, 188 N.W.2d at 789,793,795.
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be no action for prenatal ·wrongful death regardless of what is allowed
at common law. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, responded
to this criticism ·with two basic arguments. Referring to the dissenting
opinion of Justice Boggs in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 22 he expanded on the capacity of the unborn child for independent and
separate life-a point only alluded to in Womack. Since the fetus
was an independent life in fact, it should be an independent person
in law:
I£ the mother can die and the fetus live, or the fetus die and the
mother live, how can it be said that there is only one life?
I£ tortious conduct can injure one and not the other, how can
it be said that there is not a duty owing to each?

... A fetus living within the mother's womb is a living creature;
it will not die when separated from her unless the manner, the time
or the circumstances of separation constitute a fatal trauma.
The fact of life is not denied. 23

In addition to this biological argument, the majority found support
in the "legislative recognition of the personhood of the unborn,"24
manifested in a recent statute providing for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for "unborn persons."26 The court reasoned that
if the law protected the property rights of unborn persons, it should
also protect their "right to life."26
In contrast to the dissent, the majority saw nothing in the language
of the wrongful death act, as it then stood, or in the related portions
of the probate code dealing with the distribution of damages,27 to
preclude an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child. The
wrongful death act then in force allowed compensation only for the
"pecuniary injury" caused to the "dependents" of the decedent; the
court noted that this would not be easy to prove, but the allegation
of such damage in the complaint was sufficient for disposition of
22. 184 m. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900), overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill,
422, ll4 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
23. 385 Mich. at 135-37, 188 N.W.2d at 787-88.
24. 385 Mich. at 137, 188 N.W.2d at 788 (emphasis original).
25. MICH. Co:MP. LAws ANN. § 600.2045 (Supp. 1971) (originally enacted as Pub. Act
No. 292, § 1, [1968] Mich. Acts, effective Nov. 15, 1968), which provides in part:
(1) If in an action or proceeding, other than in probate court, it appears that a
person not in being may become entitled to a property interest, real or personal,
legal or equitable, involved in or affected by the action or proceeding, and the
interest of the unborn person is not or cannot otherwise properly be represented
and protected, the court, upon its own motion, or upon the motion of any party,
may appoint a suitable person to appear and act as guardian ad litem of tlie
unborn person••••
See text accompanying note 142 infra.
26. 385 Mich. at 138, 188 N.W.2d at 788.
27. The Michigan wrongful death act in force at the time the O'Neill case was
decided referred to MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 702.II5 (1968) for distribution of damages.
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defendants' motion for summary judgment.28 Justice Black further
dissented on the issue of statutory construction and suggested that
the common law, through trespass on the case, could provide a remedy
whenever it saw an unredressed ·wrong, but that Womack, involving
injury to a surviving child, could not be used to alter what he found
to be the plain meaning of the legislature in enacting the statute.29
Justice Black was correct in distinguishing the factual situation
in Womack, for the problem in O'Neill is indeed different. Not only
does the latter depend on statute rather than the common law, but its
decision also requires the abandonment of birth as the sine qua non
of life and of legal protection. An analysis of the question whether
these distictions should have led to a different result may therefore
begin with a look at both the peculiar nature of wrongful death and
the ambivalent and often contradictory attitudes of the law toward
unborn children.
At common law, it was generally accepted that "in a civil Court,
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury."80 In the United States, this position was first accepted by the
influential Massachusetts court,81 and thereafter adopted in most other
jurisdictions.82 Criticism of the rule revolved around two propositions: it was anomalous for the law to provide an action for injury
but no action for death, thereby rendering the wrongdoer less accountable when he killed rather than merely injured his victim; 83
and it was unjust to allow the family and dependents of the decedent
to go uncompensated after having been deprived of his support.34
The common-law rule has now been changed by statute in every jurisdiction.86 In a few states, survival statutes have been interpreted not
only to allow the action for injury to survive the victim's death, but
also for additional liability of the tortfeasor for the death itself.86
More common as a source of a death action are specific wrongful
28.
29.
30.
C.J.).
31.
32.

385 Mich. at 138-39, 188 N.W.2d at 788.
385 Mich. at 149-50, 188 N.W.2d at 794-95.
Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808) (Ellenborough,
Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).

See generally S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:3 (1966); Smedly,
Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605 (1960).
33. E.g., Walsh v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 173 F. 494 (D. Mass. 1909), affd., 223

U.S. 1 (1912); Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); W. PROSSER,

supra note 12, § 127, at 902 &: n.43; SPEISER, supra note 32, § 1:5.
34. E.g., Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915); W. PROSSER, supra
note 12, § 127, at 902.
35. See S. SPEISER, supra note 32, at 778-1004, collecting and comparing statutes. See
also 2 F. HARPER&: F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS,§ 24.2 (1956); Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MICH. L. REv. 545 (1935); Note, Wrongful
Death and the Stillborn Fetus-A Current Analysis, 7 HousroN L. REv. 449 (1970).
36. See, e.g., Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 A. 987 (1913), interpreting what is
now CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (Supp. 1971).
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death acts, 37 based generally on Lord Campbell's Fatal Accidents
Act38 and directed toward the compensation of families of persons
killed by creating new actions by or on behalf of the beneficiaries.
Wrongful death acts in the United States have variant provisions
concerning the proper plaintiff, the proper beneficiaries, and the types
and distribution of damages. 39 Compensation for the beneficiaries is
frequently limited to their "pecuniary injury" from loss of decedent's
services, ultimately based in some way on his earning capacity.40 In
addition to the beneficiaries' recovery, the decedent's estate itself may
be compensated for his actual pain and suffering before death, and
the medical, funeral, and burial expenses for which the estate is
liable.41 Each court must apply a statute which language and prior
case law make virtually unique to the jurisdiction. When the issue
is complicated by a prenatal child as the decedent, the decision often
turns on these narrow distinctions.42 This situation has probably hindered the development of a clear trend on prenatal wrongful death
to complement the almost complete reversal on prenatal injury.
The attitude of the law toward the unborn child has differed
according to the area involved and its underlying concepts and policy.
It has been settled since Blackstone's day that the property rights of
an unborn child are protected by the law, 43 subject to the require37. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1967); !LL• .ANN. STAT. ch. '70, § 1 (Smith-Hurd
1959); HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 663-3 (1968); Pub. Act No. 65, [1971] West's Mich. Legis. Serv.
111-12, amending MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2922 (1968), set out in part in note 1
supra; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.§ 10-7-1 (1970).
38. 9 &: 10 Viet., c. 93 (1846).
39. See statutes collected in S. SPEISER, supra note 32, § 11:16, at 636-37 (plaintiff and
beneficiaries); § 3:1, at 54-63 (damages).
40. E.g., ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 573.02(1) (Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAws § 21-5-7 (1967).
41. See Pub. Act No. 65, [1971] West's Mich. Legis. Serv. 111, amending MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.2922 (1968). The applicable portion is set out in note 1 supra. Suit is
brought by the administrator as plaintiff on behalf of those suffering pecuniary loss
and on behalf of the estate for pain and suffering and estate expenses. Pecuniary damages are distributed according to loss, and estate recovery (less the expenses) among
the heirs. For a review of the Michigan statute's damage provisions prior to the 1971
amendment, see Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970),
Cf. ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404
(1967).
42. See, e.g., Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 97, 268 P.2d 178, 179 (1954),
which held that an unborn child was not a "minor child" for wrongful death purposes
on the basis of a statutory provision (now CAL. CIV. CODE § 26 (West 1970)), which
provided for determining the age of minors from "the first minute of the day on which
persons are born." Compare Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964), applying
Pennsylvania law and allowing prenatal wrongful death recovery on the basis of the
case law of prenatal injury, with Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (196'4), subsequently interpreting Pennsylvania law to deny the action on the ground, inter alia, of
statutory requirements for distribution of damages by way of decedent's estate and
the inability of an unborn child to pass such an estate, Cf. 385 Mich. at 139, 188
N .W.2d at 789 (Black, J., dissenting).
43. I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, § 175 Gones ed. 1915). See generally Brodie, The
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ments that he be born alive44 and that considering him legally existent while en ventre sa mere be to his benefit.45 Legal recognition
was accorded "for the purpose of providing for and protecting the
child, in the hope and expectation that it will be born alive and be
capable of enjoying those rights which are thus preserved for it in
anticipation."46 In this context, the live-birth requirement is not surprising. The injustice of depriving a posthumous child of an inheritance is apparent only if the child is alive and disinherited. Property
law had early developed the idea of inchoate rights vesting upon
some future date, and the property rights of the unborn child, though
not precisely identical to any kind of future interest, are susceptible
of the same analysis.47 Future interests themselves may be created for
the benefit of persons not yet conceived, as well as those en ventre sa
mere.48 But those rights could not be passed by a stillborn child, on
the logic that since he had not yet actually lived, he could not die.49
After some vacillation, it was also settled that such inchoate rights
might arise at any time during the period of gestation. 50 There is
some indication, however, that to take property, the child must have
been born alive and viable; a child born so prematurely that it was
obvious he would soon die was treated as if he had been born dead. 51
Contrariwise, the courts have been wary of extending criminal
sanctions to punish the killing of an unborn child. Killing an unborn
quick child was at most a misdemeanor at common law, while killing
the fetus before it had quickened was no crime. 52 The degree of homiNew Biology and the Prenatal Child, 9 J. FAMILY L. 391 (1970); Gordon, supra note 12;
Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 HAsrlNcs L.J. 51
(1969); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies,
46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971); Note, The Unborn Child: Consistency in the Law?, 2
SUFFOLK L. R.Ev. 228 (1968).
44. Wehrman v. Farmers'&: Merchants' Sav. :Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935);
Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige 35 (N.Y. 1830).
45. McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass.
(15 Pick.) 255 (1834). The requirement that the action be for the benefit of the child
does not exclude actions in favor of those claiming through a deceased child (Wehrman
v. Farmers' &: Merchants' Sav. :Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935)), but does bar
actions that would diminish a child's estate. M'Knight v. Read, 1 Whart. 212 (Pa. 1835).
46. Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige 35, 40 (N.Y. 1830).
47. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 4.88 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
48. Id. at§ 4.87.
49. The court was persuaded by an argument to this effect in Marsellis v. Thalhimer,
2 Paige 35 (N.Y. 1830). See 2 Paige at 38 (appellee's brief).
50. Kimbro v. Harper, 113 Okla. 46, 238 P. 840 (1925).
51. Tomlin v. Laws, 301 Ill. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922) (dictum); Marsellis v. Thalhimer,
2 Paige 35 (N.Y. 1830) (dictum based on the civil-law doctrine).
52. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 29 (2d ed. 1969). A child is quick when it is
capable of moving in its mother's womb. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 715, 87
S.E.2d 100, 102 (1955). On criminal law and the unborn, see generally Comment, The
Role of the Law of Homicide in Fetal Destruction, 56 IOWA L. R.Ev. 658 (1971);
Comment, The Fetus as a Legal Entity-Facing Reality, 8 SAN Draco L. R.Ev. 126 (1971);
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cide has been increased to manslaughter in some jurisdictions, with
the requirement that the child be quick usually retained. 03 Infanticide could be punished as murder only after the prosecution had
proved live birth, the presumption being that the child had been
born dead. 54 Although the live-birth requirement led to a good deal
of unresolved debate on how it was to be established, it remained
unaltered. The strict construction of criminal law, with its corollary
that there may be no punishment unless clearly authorized by law,
has thwarted any judicial tendency to treat as murder the killing of
a child not yet born.im
Paralleling the common law of homicide was that of abortion.
The latter constituted a misdemeanor if the child was quick, but no
crime otherwise.56 The idea that an unborn child was less deserving
of protection before quickening drew some adverse comment, particularly when compared with the protection of property rights
throughout gestation,57 and statutes were eventually passed broad
enough to outlaw abortion at any stage of pregnancy.Gs Indeed the
definition of abortion has been expanded in some cases to include an
attempt to cause a miscarriage, dispensing entirely with the need for
an existing fetus at any level of development. Thus a conviction for
abortion could be sustained even though the woman was not pregnant, 69 or when pregnancy was required by the statute, even if the
Note, 46 NOTRE
note 43.

DAME

LAw. 349, supra note 43; Note, 2 SUFFOLK L. REV. 228, supra

53. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.322 (1968), which provides: "The willful
killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of such child, which would
be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter."
See also R. PERKINS, supra note 52, at 29.
54. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (1936); Annot., 159
A.L.R. 523 (1945). See generally Meldman, Legal Concepts of Human Life: The Infanticide Doctrines, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 105 (1968). For the position of property law,
see Wehrman v. Farmers' & Merchants' Sav. Bank, 221 Iowa 249, 259 N.W. 564 (1935)
(presumption of live birth after eighth month).
55. Thus, in Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr, 481
(1970), the court was constrained to hold that a child in the process of being born is not
a "human being'' in terms of the homicide statute, primarily on the ground that to hold
otherwise would be a violation of due process: the accused could not have known that
his act constituted the crime of murder. This decision was overruled by the legislature
in an amendment (Assembly Bill 816, 1970 Reg. Sess.) to CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
Supp. 1968) declaring feticide to be murder. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 187 (West Supp.
1971). This legislative response is discussed in Comment, Is the Intentional Killing of an
Unborn Child Homicide? California's Law To Punish the Willful Killing of a Fetus,
2 PAC. L.J. 170 (1971).
56. Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204 (1879); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass,
(9 Met.) 263 (1845). See R. PERKINS, supra note 52, at 140.
57. Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 209-10 (1879).
58. R. PERKINS, supra note 52, at 141.
59. Adams v. State, 81 Nev. 524, 407 P.2d 169 (1965); People v. Feigin, 174 Cal, App,
2d 553, 345 P.2d 273 (1959); Commonwealth v. Aronson, 330 Mass. 453, ll5 N,E.2d !162
(195!1).
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fetus was dead. 60 While the prohibition of abortion at common law
could be considered a protection of the unborn child's right to life,
the effect of these later decisions has been to make the mother rather
than the fetus the victim of the crime. 61 In any case, the penalty was
never as severe for an abortion as for a postnatal homicide, and the
right of the fetus to life was always subordinated to the life, and in
most cases to the health, of the mother. 62
The law of prenatal torts has developed against this common-law
background, but has presented special problems of its own. Three
different factual situations may be distinguished. The first is represented by Womack: an unborn child is injured en ventre sa mere,
is born, and then bring-s suit for his injuries through a guardian. With
the exception of Alabama, every United States jurisdiction that has
considered the issue now allows recovery on these facts. 63 The second
situation involving a tortious prenatal injury arises when the child is
born but subsequently dies from the effects of the injury. This is a
straightfonvard wrongful death situation, except that the original
injury is prenatal. The child would have had an action for personal
injuries had he lived; since he was born alive and lived for at least
some time after birth, there is little hesitation in allowing suit for
his wrongful death.64 Third, in the prenatal wrongful death situation
as in O'Neill, the child is stillborn as a result of defendant's tortious
act; the death occurs before birth. It is here that the cases split, although a majority of jurisdictions now allow recovery. 65 Those that
60. People v. Marra, 27 Mich. App. I, 183 N.W.2d 418 (1970).
61. In re Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 117, 123 N.W.2d 253,254 (1963); State v. Thompson,
56 N.J. Super. 438, 444, 153 A.2d 364, 367 (1959). One factor promoting this change of
attitude has been the justification of abortion law as protecting women from serious
injury or death from improperly administered abortions. For a criticism of this view
as the sole justification, see Note, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, supra note 43.
62. R. PERKINS, supra note 52, at 145-47.
63. See notes 7-18 supra and accompanying text.
64. Torigian v. Watertown News Co., Inc., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967);
Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962);
Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
65. In addition to Michigan (by the O'Neill case), the following states now allow
recovery. Connecticut: Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962);
Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo &: Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); District
of Columbia: Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Georgia: Porter
v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Indiana: Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20
(Ind. App. 1971); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d I (1962); Kentucky:
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Maryland: State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn.
365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 S.2d 434
(1954); Nevada: White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); New Hampshire:
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Ohio: Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964), accord, Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d
75 (4th Cir. 1964); West Virginia: Baldwin v. Butcher, 1:84 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971),
accord, Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Wisconsin:
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
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do must not merely treat the unborn child as susceptible to injury
but also find birth irrelevant to whether he is a person who can be
wrongfully killed within the terms of the statute.
When courts first began to allow recovery for prenatal ·wrongful
death, it was natural for them to draw primarily on the developing
law and commentary of the related tort of prenatal injury. The analogy was particularly apt in the earliest cases, which involved obstetrical malpractice actions against attending physicians who negligently destroyed the infants in the process of delivery. 66 Not only
could a court simplify the problem of the defendant's duty of due
care toward the unborn child, since the doctor certainly knew the
mother was pregnant, but the act also occurred immediately before
birth was due, making the requirement of live birth seem particularly
arbitrary. In such a case, one court found it "too plain for argument
that where independent existence is possible and life is destroyed
through a wrongful act a cause of action arises under the [wrongful
death] statutes cited."67 The court did not discuss the role of birth
in establishing a person whom the law could recognize as having been
wrongfully killed, and it has been criticized for ignoring this point. 68
Nevertheless, the action has gained considerable acceptance, and the
O'Neill decision follows that trend in recognizing the unborn as
persons for at least some purposes. How far this acknowledgment goes
is not made entirely clear, but the answer is important not only to
tort law but also to other legal treatment of the unborn, particularly
Two courts, while denying recovery on the particular facts presented, intimated that
the action would be allowed under proper circumstances. Alaska: Mace v. Jung, 210 F.
Supp. 706 (D. Alas. 1962) (not viable); Missouri: Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.
1965) (not viable; beneficiaries collateral relatives, not parents).
The following states deny recovery. California: Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App.
2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Florida: Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 S.2d 695 {Fla.
1958); Illinois: Chrisaforeorgis v. Brandenberg, 40 U.S.L.W. 2502 (Ill. Ct. App. Feb. 8,
1972); Iowa: McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971), disapproving a
prior interpretation of Iowa law in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960);
Massachusetts: Leccese v. McDonough, 40 U.S.L.W. 2546 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Feb. 22,
1972); Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); New
Jersey: Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1954); New York: Endresz v. Freid•
berg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); North Carolina: Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Oklahoma: Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d
16 (Okla. 1967); Pennsylvania: Caroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47,202 A.2d 9 (1964), disapproving
a prior interpretation of Pennsyvania law in Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.
1964); Tennessee: Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Virginia:
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
Since allowing an action for prenatal injury does not necessarily imply that a court
will allow an action for prenatal wrongful death (see notes 72-75 infra and accompany•
ing text), the question must be regarded as open where it has not been specifically
resolved.
6'6. Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 S.2d 434 (1954); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229
Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
67. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 370-71, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (1949).
68. Gordon, supra note 12, at 591-95; Miller, No Recovery for Injury to a 'Piable
Fetus Which Is Stillborn, 36 INs. CouNSEL J. 92 (1969).
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to the current trend in abortion reform, which appears to be headed
in the opposite direction.69
In finding that birth is irrelevant to recovery, O'Neill makes a
major departure from the property and criminal law concepts, where
live birth is of fundamental importance. Indeed, it diverges even
from the prenatal injury cases like Womack, in which the victim has
survived to bring his own action and his legal existence at the time
of the lawsuit is not disputed. The real problem in the past in such
cases was whether at the time of the injury the fetus was a person to
whom a tort duty was owed.70 To support an affirmative conclusion,
the courts have used two basic rationales. One is based on the causal
relationship: if the natural process of gestation is disrupted "resulting
in harm to the child when born, it is immaterial whether before birth
the child is considered a person in being." 71 This approach is consonant with the established proposition in the law of torts that if a
chain of causation can be established, the tort occurs when the harm
occurs, notwithstanding that defendant's own act or omission has
been completed.72 Under this reasoning, the harm completing the
tort is not the fetal trauma but the suffering caused by the tort
victim's continuing disablement and attendant medical expenses.
Under this reasoning there is damage, and hence a cause of action,
only after birth. Even when the ,vrongful death statute is coextensive
with the common law, as held by the O'Neill case, no ,vrongful death
action would arise unless the child had first acquired a personal injury
cause of action. 73 Thus, a court may allow recovery for postnatal
69. The current attack on the statutes broadly prohibiting abortion (see notes 56'-62
supra and accompanying text) is based not on the proposition that the fetus has no
rights, but that the laws are an invasion of the mother's right to privacy, Babbitz v.
McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
402 U.S. 903 (1970); that the laws are unconstitutionally vague, People v. Belous, 71
Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); or
both, Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), appeal pending, 402 U.S. 941
(1971). Defense of such statutes, however, might be based on the proposition that the
unborn child is constitutionally protected. See Noonan, supra note 43.
70. See, e.g., Maguolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78
S.W.2d 944, 949-50 (1935), overruled by Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419
S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884). There is
little doubt now that the unborn are owed a duty. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
35, § 18.3, at 1030: "[T]he improper canning of baby food today is negligence to a child
born next week or next year, who consumes it to his injury. The limitation of the
Palsgraf case contains no requirement that the interests within the range of peril be
known or identified in the actor's mind, or even be in existence at the time of the
negligence." See also Gordon, supra note 12, at 597-600. Duty and foreseeability problems have been subsumed into the larger question of the status of the unborn child
in tort law and are rarely discussed in recent prenatal injury or wrongful death cases.
But see Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967), overruling
Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
71. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960). See Gordon, supra
note 12, at 590-91.
72. W. PRosSER, supra note 12, § 30, at 143-44.
73. Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 242-43, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958).
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·wrongful death, even if resulting from a prenatal injury, but can
allow no recovery without a live birth.74 Womack, adopting the
causation reasoning of Smith,7 5 did not require the result reached in
O'Neill, and this theory has left jurisdictions free to give recovery
for prenatal injury but to deny it for prenatal wrongful death.
To justify recovery in O'Neill, the Michigan court used a different
approach to prenatal torts, based on the biological arguments of
Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire.76 The crux of that prenatal injury
case, if recovery were to be allowed as Justice Boggs thought, was to
find the unborn child a separate being, rather than merely a part of
the mother to whom defendant was not separately liable.77 He had
the additional task of distinguishing Dietrich, on which the majority
had principally relied. His response was to turn to medical science
as authority for the proposition that the unborn child, at least after
it became viable, enjoyed an independent existence.78 Since the unborn child could survive even if his mother had died, his life was no
longer directly dependent on hers, and he could be treated as a
separate person. Thus birth became irrelevant to the unborn child's
separate identity as a tort victim. With the increased knowledge of
the prenatal causes of postnatal problems, it is natural, at least in
medicine, to think of birth not as the beginning of life, but as the
culmination of gestation: an infant can be defined as simply a "viable
fetus which has been born." 79 The entire process of gestation and the
early postnatal life become one continuum in which birth is no more
than an incident. An actionable claim for prenatal injury would arise
as soon as this separate biological entity is injured. 80
The choice of theories makes no practical difference in a prenatal
injury case when the child is born alive, but is decisive when the
child is stillborn. Technically, if the prenatal injury is complete and
actionable at the instant of fetal trauma, a subsequent death creates
a death action immediately, without requiring an intervening live
birth for the prenatal injury action to "accrue."81 This theory is
74. Compare Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967),
with Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 663, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); and Shousha
v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962), with Durrett v.
Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963).
75. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 22 supra. See also Gordon, supra note 12, at 588-90.
77. Mrs. Allaire was injured in an elevator accident, which left her subsequently
born child permanently crippled. She settled with the hospital for her own injuries.
78. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). A viable
child is one capable of living outside the womb. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140
(D.D.C. 1946).
79. J. GREENHILL, PRINCIPLES AND PRAcrICE OF OBSl"EI1UC.S 7 (13th ed. 1965).
80. State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 184, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964).
81. State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 183, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964); Corke
v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 261, 181 A.2d 448, 451 (1962).
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especially inviting under the wording of the Michigan wrongful death
statute, which gives recovery for death "in every such case" in which
there would have been an action at law.82 The idea of an unborn
child capable of independent life as a "person" for personal injury
might naturally lead to the assumption that he is the same "person"
as is mentioned in the wrongful death statute.
On either theoretical basis, however, the very existence of the
prenatal injury action has eliminated many of the practical arguments
that could be made against prenatal wrongful death. It is no longer
possible to state flatly that the child is part of its mother. 83 While it is
not required that medical concepts be incorporated into the law,84
the courts have shown a willingness to adopt them if necessary to
remedy what was, at least in prenatal injury cases, a clear injustice.85
Fear of fraudulent claims and the difficulty of proving causal connection have not been allowed to stand in the way of a prenatal
injury action.86 Neither should they prevent the recognition of an
action for prenatal wrongful death. There does not seem to be any
significant difference in the proof of cause and effect in a wrongful
death action than in a miscarriage action. The latter is admittedly
susceptible of arousing the improper sympathy of the jury by the
nature of the harm, while providing only indefinite indications of
how the defendant brought the injury about. But this specter has
not prevented the courts from recognizing that a miscarriage is a real
injury to the mother and permitting damages to be recovered, with
improper or speculative evidence eliminated by the trial judge. 87 The
same should be true for prenatal wrongful death. It is not the function of appellate courts to proscribe otherwise meritorious causes of
action because of difficulty of proof in some cases.88 Rather the courts
should be responding to those medical advances that provide increasingly more reliable proof of causation.
82. MrCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2922 (1968), as amended, Pub. Act No. 65, [1971]
West's Mich. Legis. Serv. III, set out in part in note I supra. This language is preserved
in the amended version. Compare the construction of N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:31-l (1951),
in Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 305-06, 204 A.2d 140, 142 (1964).
83. Smith v• .Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 362, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960); Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
84. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 592.
85. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 362-63, 157 A.2d 497,501 (1960).
86. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 365-66, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960); Amann v. Faidy,
415 Ill. 422, 431, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417 (1953); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102
N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
87. Atwood v. Washington Water Power Co., 79 Wash. 427, 140 P. 343 (1914); Cox v.
Nix, 87 Ga. App. 837, 75 S.E.2d 331 (1953).
88. Cf. 2 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, supra note 35, at 1029, in reference to prenatal
injury:
A categorical prohibition of attempts at proof must here be justified upon an assumption that false but legally sufficient evidence will not only be offered but also
accepted by the tribunal, in cases of this kind, more often than true evidence will
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The essential differences between prenatal injury and prenatal
wrongful death must, however, be kept in mind. Every person-at
least after birth-has a practical interest in his own continued existence, as well as his bodily integrity. This is not the interest protected
by wrongful death statutes, for they vindicate the rights of the decedent's family and dependents to the continued benefits of his existence. Likewise, what is really being vindicated in O'Neill is the
right of the unborn child's parents to recover for their loss. The
concept of the unborn child as a juridical person should not be
lifted out of the context of prenatal injury and imputed into the
wrongful death statute just because it exists. But this idea, like the
different treatments of the unborn child in property and criminal
law, is there if the court needs it. The judicial attitude to prenatal
wrongful death has now resulted in an approximately even split of
jurisdictions, and a choice of reasonably coherent legal theories that
justify either result without impairing the validity of the accepted
common-law negligence suit for prenatal injuries to a surviving child.
The courts' choice of results must therefore tum to a greater extent
on the policies of the law, and specifically those furthered by wrongful death.
The most perplexing problem in this regard has been the nature
of the loss to be compensated. In cases of prenatal injury, the damage
is clear. The plaintiff himself, for the rest of his life, "bears the seal
of another's fault." 89 The obvious necessity for giving compensation
for this injury has been important in overriding the more technical
considerations that the injury was inflicted before plaintiff's birth.
But for the wrongfully stillborn child, the reasons for giving compensation to his parents are less compelling.90 There can be no doubt
that the parents have suffered a loss of some kind. They have been
deprived of their prospective child with the companionship and services that he could have provided. They are also deprived of his
present society and his influence on the family. 91 The problem is
whether any of this admitted loss is compensable by law. The wrongful death statute applicable to O'Neill, like many others still in force,
would limit recoverable damages to the "pecuniary injury" suffered
by the beneficiaries.92 Under such a statute, plaintiff must not only
be. Such an assumption not only shows a cynical lack. of faith in the ability of our
courts and juries to sift the true from the false, but it is a highly questionable one
in fact.
89. Montreal Tramways v. Leville, 4 DL.R. 337, 344 (1933).
90. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 312, 204 A.2d 140, 146 (1964); In re Logan's Estate,
4 Misc. 2d 283, 285, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (Surr. Ct.), affd. mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 842, 156
N.Y.S.2d 152 (1956), affd. mem., 3 N.Y.2d 800, 144 N.E.2d 644, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
91. See generally A. &: L. COLMAN, PREGNANCY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ExPERIENCE
(1971).
92. See note 1 supra.
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show that an injury has been suffered; he must do so by sufficient
evide:qce so that the verdict is not based on mere speculation and a
desire to punish the wrongdoer. The inability of plaintiff to offer
proofs that are not "uniformly speculative" has been instrumental
in the denial of the action, 93 and the importance of this problem is
confirmed by the fact that three of the jurisdictions that have allowed
recovery did so on the ground that the relevant ·wrongful death statute provided nonpecuniary damages.M Because the plaintiffs in
O'Neill had appealed from a summary judgment, their allegations of
pecuniary loss were taken at face value; they would stand or fall in
the trial court.95 But in reference to the loss suffered, the court cited
Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co.~96 which had put a narrow construction
upon what would constitute pecuniary loss. It then drew by analogy
from In re Olney's Estate97 the measure of damages: "[P]arents are
entitled to the net value of their children's services; these are pecuniary injuries with respect to which the parents stand in the capacity
of dependents ...." 98 In holding that prenatal wrongful death results
in calculable pecuniary loss, O'Neill is in a minority of the jurisdictions that have considered prenatal wrongful death.
The earlier Michigan case of Wycko v. Gnodtke99 had rejected
the net-value-of-services measure of damages for the death of a minor
child and proposed instead the use of an investment-in-child theory,
under which plaintiff could recover for the expenses of birth, food,
clothing, medicine, instruction, nurture, and shelter, and, in addition, the "value of mutual society and protection, in a word, companionship" of the decedent.10° Constrained by the wrongful death
statute, Wycko necessarily considered companionship a pecuniary
loss. Breckon, however, was devoted to the "identification and elimination of all of Wycko's unnecessary dicta," 101 and left standing little
more than its bare holding that damages of $14,000 for the death of
a fourteen-year old boy were not excessive. It repudiated the value
of companionship as an element of pecuniary loss and rejected plaintiff's argument that minor amendments to the wrongful death statute
93. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 311, 204 A.2d 140, 145 (1964) (emphasis original).
Accord, Endresz v. Freidberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969);
Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
94. White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527,458 P.2d 617 (1969); Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F.
Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964)
(South Carolina).
95. 385 Mich. at 139, 188 N.W.2d at 788.
96. 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970).
97. 309 Mich. 65, 14 N.W.2d 574 (1944) (damages to husband for wrongful death of
wife).
98. 385 Mich. at 139, 188 N.W.2d at 788.
99. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
100. 361 Mich. at 339-40, 105 N.W.2d at 122.
101. 383 Mich. at 271, 174 N.W.2d at 843.
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in 1965 had constituted a legislative endorsement of Wycko. Even
under the Breckon interpretation of the statute, the O'Neill court
concluded that pecuniary loss could be found in a prenatal case.102
The proof of pecuniary loss as so interpreted is indeed difficult,
but not impossible. It differs from the problems of damages for the
death of minor children more in degree than in kind. The most
common standard for damages is essentially the earning capacity of
the decedent, less the expenses of upbringing.103 For the death of a
child, earning capacity and family services are usually considered
only for the time of his minority,104 although probable support of
his parents in their old age is sometimes taken into account. 10G When
a very young child has demonstrated no actual earning capacity, a
damage recovery is usually still allowed, based on his prospective
earnings, as well as his present capacity for services.106 The fact that
the earnings of a stillborn child are necessarily prospective should
not by itself defeat recovery. The problem lies in the scarcity of
elements from which they can be computed. For the young child,
the jury is usually allowed to consider items such as the child's age,
sex, ambition, physical and mental characteristics, the parents' social
and economic status, and the employment of other children in the
family. 107 This framework naturally allows considerable latitude for
discretion of the jury but is not considered reason to bar the action. 108
102. In so far as Wycko stands for the lost-investment theory, it was properly rejected
by O'Neill. This approach justifies a larger recovery for the death of a minor child than
the traditional pecuniary measure of net value of services. As applied in Wyc/10, it upheld a jury verdict of $14,000 plus funeral expenses against the trial judge's remittitur
ordered on the ground that no boy of fourteen could have an earning capacity justifying
a verdict of more than $7500. The parents' investment in the prenatal child is necessarily minimal. Even if all the expenses of pregnancy were considered to be such an
investment, including the mother's general medical expenses and possibly lost earnings
from leaving employment, a recovery based on that theory would be considerably less
than under the normal standard. It does have the advantage of certainty of proof, and
stripped of the element of loss of companionship, it is a legitimate measure of damages
under a pecuniary-loss type statute. See Haupt v. Yale Rubber Co,, 29 Mich. App. 225,
185 N.W.2d 161 (1970), appeal granted, 384 Mich. 813 (1971). But it bears little relation
to the real injury involved. Comment, Developments in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful
Death, 69 DICK. L. REv. 258, 267 (1965).
103. S. SPEISER, supra note 32, § 3:1, at 60, § 4:20, at 332.
104. S. SPEISER, supra note 32, § 4:20, at 332.
105. Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792, '194 (D.D.C. 1952), affd.
per curiam, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953); S. SPEISER, supra note 32, § 4:21, at 334-36,
106. City of Louisville v. Stukenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. Ky. 1968); 13lack v.
Michigan Cent. R.R., 146 Mich. 568, 573, 109 N.W. 1052, 1054-55 (1906).
107. Sceba v. Manistee Ry., 189 Mich. 308, 321, 155 N.W. 414, 41'1-18 (1915); Ihl v.
Forty-Second St. &: G. St. Ferry R.R., 47 N.Y. 317, 321 (1872); Gluckauf v. Pinc Lake
Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8, 22, 187 A.2d 357, 364 (App. Div. 1963); Jordan v.
Smyk, 29 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64, 262 App. Div. 414, 416 (1941), revd. on other grounds, 288
N.Y. 525, 41 N.E.2d 930 (1942). See S. SPEISER, supra note 32, § 4:26, at 345.
108. Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.D.C. 1952), affcl.
per curiam, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78
N.J. Super. 8, 22, 187 A.2d 357, 363-65 (App. Div. 1963); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Oltio
App. 431, 435, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
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In the case of the stillborn child, fewer of these elements are present,
but the child's sex, to some extent his physical characteristics, and
the family's position in life can still be determined, and from these
it would seem that a jury could find the pecuniary value of his life
to his parents ·with no more speculation than is normal in the case
of infant death.109 The law allows recovery in the latter case because
it accepts that the life of an infant has some value. The law should
allow the same for prenatal death unless it is prepared to say that
the life of an unborn child has no value at all.
Indeed, this problem also comes down to the relevance of birth
as a place to draw the line, or the relevance of any line.11° But even
if the biological view of life as a continuum is rejected when considering the child, the issue here is the parents and their loss. Birth
may be relevant to the nature of the companionship and society of
the child, but it is hardly relevant to the existence of the pecuniary
loss suffered by the parents.111 As the issue is primarily one of sufficiency of evidence, the Michigan court was correct in leaving its
determination to the trial judge, rather than deciding it on a motion
for summary judgment.
At any rate, future plaintiffs in similar Michigan cases will have
less of a problem. Only nventy-one days after the O'Neill decision,
the legislature approved an amendment to the wrongful death statute
deleting all references to "pecuniary" loss and specifically providing
recovery "for the loss of the society and campanionship [sic] of the
deceased."112 While the precise effect of the amended statute is unclear, it does provide an element of damages not limited by the difficult proof of pecuniary loss. Damages for loss of companionship may
themselves be somewhat speculative in application, but they surely
correspond more closely with the actual loss suffered and the difficulty
of proof should not deter the courts.113 Their association with the
109. In Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1952), affd.
per curiam, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953), damages of $17,000 were allowed for the
death of an infant three days after birth from the effects of a delivery room accident.
It is difficult to think of any item of proof of pecuniary loss present in such a case
that was not present, for example, in Rainey v. Hom, 221 Miss. 269, 72 S.2d 434 (1954),
where the obstetrician negligently killed the baby shortly before it would otherwise
have been normally born. The only distinction is that the first child proved his ability
to survive birth. But the chance that a child would have died from other causes shortly
after defendant actually killed him is always present, and has never been considered
to make damages more speculative. Inasmuch as the elements of evidence focus on the
actual characteristics of the child, they will naturally be more difficult to prove as the
wrongful death occurs earlier in pregnancy, and this factor will contribute to the diminution of the recovery, reflecting what the jury in any case would probably consider
to be the pecuniary value of the unborn child's life. See generally Del Tufo, Recovery
for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RtrrcERS L. R.Ev. 61 (1960).
110, Gordon, supra note 12, at 593-94.
111. See Del Tufo, supra note 109, at 76-78.
112. Pub. Act No. 65 was enacted July 28, 1971, and became effective ninety days
after end of session. O'Neill was decided on July 7, 1971.
113. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 339, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960): "[W]e
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"investment" theory of Wycko would suggest that they apply to
present rather than prospective companionship. But the companionship of an unborn child is felt by the family, psychologically as well
as physically.114 This is particularly true after quickening, and to this
extent it seems probable that recovery would be higher for fetal loss
later in pregnancy than earlier. But companionship undeniably exists
before birth, and if it is lost through the tortious act of another, the
loss can be compensated under the statute.
By viewing the action in terms of the parents' loss, rather than
the harm done to the unborn child itself, the court can avoid the
complex problem of the nature of the injury. The Michigan court
speaks of the law's solicitude for "the first unalienable right of manthe right to life itself."115 But the Michigan wrongful death statute
does not and never did directly protect that right; rather it protects
the rights of specified persons not to be deprived of the services-and
now companionship-of the unborn child. In this respect, the prenatal wrongful death action is fundamentally different from the prenatal injury action, which protects the child's "right to begin life
with a sound mind and body,"116 and even more different from the
problem of abortion, which concerns the unborn child's right to life.
Since prenatal wrongful death is an action on behalf of the parents,
if the Michigan Legislature were to decide that abortion is neither
criminal nor against public policy, the mother's consent to abortion,
by ordinary standards of tort law, would prevent conflict with the
right of recovery for prenatal wrongful death. 117 In practice, the
wrongful death action does vindicate the child's right to be born,
but in a more limited context than the laws currently making abortion criminal. There is obviously a special relation between the
mother and the unborn child that cannot be treated by the courts
either as though there were two fully independent persons or as
though the child were merely a part of the mother.118 The abortion
issue involves the resolution of the mother's rights as against the
child's when the two are in conflict.119 Whatever may be the detercannot shirk this difficult problem of valuation. In the cases coming to us a life has
been taken and it is our duty, as best we can, to put a fair valuation on it."
114. See generally A. &: L. COLMAN, supra note 91.
115. 385 Mich. at 138,188 N.W.2d at 788.
116. Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 225 (1971), quoting
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
117. On consent, see generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 18, at 101. The father
presents a different problem, but one that can be handled through implied consent,
Herko v. Uviller, 203 Misc. 108, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1952). The consent problem is discussed in Comment, The New York Abortion Reform Law: Con•
siderations, Application and Legal Consequences-More Than We Bargained For'I, 35
ALBANY L. R.Ev. 644, 657-62 (1971).
118. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140-42 (D.D.C. 1946).
119. See Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis.), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 402 U.S. 903 (1970).
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mination of the rights in that context, this special relation gives a
third-party tortfeasor no comparable rights. In decriminalizing abortion under certain limited conditions, the legislatures are saying that
under those circumstances, abortion is not a wrongful death. Where,
as in Michigan, the conscious solicitude of the law is for the parents'
rights to the services and companionship of their children, born or
unborn, the fact that some parents might choose to forgo these rights
need not preclude recovery by those who do not.
In practice, the jury may award damages based on the gravity of
the ·wrong, despite the requirement that they be compensatory only,
and this suggests that the prenatal wrongful death action gives a
windfall to the beneficiaries and punishes the tortfeasor.120 But to
the extent that the action does vindicate the rights of the unborn
child, such a result is not entirely unwarranted. Most commentators
today reject the penal nature of tort law,121 though the wrongful
death statutes of a few states are admittedly punitive,122 while others
allow noncompensatory damages without requiring that loss be
shown.123 One of the rationalizations for this scheme has been that
it should not be made more profitable for the tortfeasor to kill his
victims than injure them. 124 The same anomaly is present in the law
of prenatal torts, since an action for injury exists almost everywhere,
but is not always matched by a comparable action for prenatal
death.125 In fact, there is a double anomaly, since not only can the
tortfeasor foreclose his own liability by doing more serious harm,
but liability further turns on the fortuitous circumstance of whether
120. Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 400, 146 S.E.2d 425, 4-28 (196'6); Carroll v. Skloff,
415 Pa. 47, 49-50, 202 A.2d 9, 11 (1964); Gordon, supra note 12, at 595. See In re Logan's
Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Surr. Ct.), afjd. mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 84-2, 156
N.Y.S.2d 152 (1956), afjd. mem., 3 N.Y.2d 800, 144 N.E.2d 644, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
121. E.g., 2 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, supra note 35, § 12.1, at 746; W. PROSSER, supra
note 12, § 2, at 9. This view has not always been accepted. See J. SALMOND, I.Aw OF
TORTS § 6, at 29 (15th ed. 1969).
122. E.g., Hardin v. Sellers, 276 Ala. 156, 117 S.2d 383 (1960), interpreting ALA. CODE
tit. 7, § 123 (1960); Thayer v. Perini Corp., 303 F. Supp. 683 (1969), interpreting MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1970).
123. E.g., TEx. ANN. CIV. STAT. art. 4673 (1952) (exemplary damages); W. VA. CoDE
ANN. § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1970) (damages of up to $10,000 as "fair and just" notwithstanding
plaintiff's inability to prove pecuniary loss).
124. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
125. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 148 N.W.2d
107, 110 (196'7), notes that
a doctor or a midwife whose negligent acts in delivering a baby produced the
baby's death would be legally immune from a lawsuit. However, if they badly
injured the child they would be exposed to liability. Such a legal rule would
produce the absurd result that an unborn child who was badly injured by the
tortious acts of another, but who was born alive, could recover while an unborn
child, who was more severely injured and died as the result of the tortious acts
of another, could recover nothing.
This was the essential situation present in Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38
N.W.2d 838 (1949), and the precise facts of Rainey v. Hom, 221 Miss. 269, 72 S.2d 434
(1954), both of which allowed recovery. Neither case, however, gave that explicit
justification.

748

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 70:729

or not birth-even traumatic birth-occurs before death. Courts
allowing recovery have construed the wrongful death act to eliminate
this problem, a not surprising result when it is considered that the act
was originally passed to eliminate the analogous distinction between
postnatal injury and death.
A defect in this argument is that killing the unborn child may not
be as great a harm as injuring him.126 Therapeutic abortion statutes
frankly recognize that some unborn children are better off dead,127
although the courts have been more reluctant to admit this.128 As
far as the tortfeasor himself is concerned, his financial liability for
injury may indeed be far greater than for death, even if the death
action is allowed.129 But regardless of whether the ·wrong is greater
or lesser, if the unborn child does have a right to be born alive
(conditional on the mother's consent), justice is not served by refusing to place a value on his life and his parents' loss. 180
A different problem arises from the relation of the new action
for prenatal wrongful death to the existing action of the mother for
miscarriage. The physical harm involved in either action is essentially
the same. Although the miscarriage action focuses on the mother's
injury, and prenatal ·wrongful death on the unborn child's, the recovery from the second action is on behalf of the parents and naturally benefits the mother if she survives. This result leads to the
possibility of a double recovery by the mother. Technically, compensation is given for two separate interests: the bodily injury of the
mother, with immediately resulting mental distress, on the one hand,
and her pecuniary or societal loss from the unborn child's death on
the other. In practice, however, the jury is likely to consider the
totality of the wrong done whatever the legal theory involved.181
The great majority of jurisdictions deny the mother in a mis126. Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth,
J., dissenting); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 312, 204 A.2d 140, 146 (1964).
127. E.g., CAL. HEALm & SMEIY CODE§§ 25950-54 (West Supp. 1971).
128. Cf. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), in which a child born
disabled sued in medical malpractice for the doctor's failure to tell his parents that
German measles caused birth defects and to advise an abortion. The court held that
there was no cause for "wrongful life." 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. The prob•
lem is discussed in Tedeschi, Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", I IsRAEL L. REY. 513
(1966), 7 J. FAMILY L. 465 (1967); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": [A
Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REY. 58 (1970); Note, Wrongful Life-No Cause of
Action for Failure To Inform Parents of Possible Birth Defects, 13 WAYNE L. REV.
750 (1967).
129. Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. S.C. 1960), resulted in a verdict of
$260,000 for a prenatally injured child born totally disabled. It is doubtful that sucl1
an award could be made for prenatal wrongful death without incurring a remittitur.
Cf. Nord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1952), affd. per
curiam, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953), discussed in note 109 supra (postnatal accident).
130. Cf. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 339, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960), quoted
in note 113 supra.
131. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 55, at 338; Comment, supra note 102, at 267.
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carriage action any recovery for the loss of the child itself but allow
compensation for the attendant emotional distress at the time, which
undoubtedly reflects the particular nature of the injury.132 In the
few exceptions to this rule, the recovery edges toward the loss-ofcompanionship damages for prenatal wrongful death.133 The close
relationship benveen the nature of the two actions suggests that a
solution to the prenatal wrongful death problem might be to expand
the action for miscarriage to include compensation for the loss of
the child.134 While this proposal has not gained nearly the acceptance
that the wrongful death approach has, it is apparent that the nature
of prenatal wrongful death requires a re-examination of the miscarriage limitation. In the leading Michigan case, Tunnicliffe v. Bay
Cities Consolidated Railway Co.,135 plaintiff sought damages for loss
of "the society, enjoyment, and prospective services of the child."136
The state supreme court denied recovery on the ground that such
damage was too speculative for proof.137 Through the combined result of the O'Neill decision and the amendment to the wrongful death
statute, all the damages that were sought and refused in Tunnicliffe
can now be obtained in a suit for the ·wrongful death of the unborn
child. Some courts have been disturbed by the prospect of converting
every miscarriage action into a suit for wrongful death. 138 In practice,
the judicial workload would not be changed, although the legal
theories might prove confusing to a jury, especially since such an
action would probably be consolidated for trial with the mother's
suit for her injuries or her beneficiary's suit for her wrongful death. 139
132. E.g., Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555, 570 (W.D. Pa. 1947);
Fchely v. Senders, 170 Ore. 457, 460, 135 P.2d 283, 284 (1943); Malone v. Monongahela
Valley Traction Co., 104 W. Va. 417, 426, 140 S.E. 340, 344 (1927); Tunnicliffe v. Bay
Cities Consol. Ry., 102 Mich. 624, 629-30, 61 N.W. 11, 12 (1894); Duncan v. Martin's
Restaurant, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 183, 190, 106 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1952).
133. In Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 S.2d 847, 848 (La. App. 1951),
the court was prepared to allow recovery for the "mental anguish, disappointment and
grief caused by the present and future loss of companionship of the expected child,"
but plaintiff failed to prove causation. 50 S.2d at 850-52. In Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615,
618-19, 151 S. 468, 471-72 (1933), the court made the distinction that "no recovery of
damages is sought on account of the death of the child, but for the pain and anguish
suffered by the mother on account of its death," and allowed the latter. These cases
are distinguishable from prenatal wrongful death cases in that they do not allow
recovery for the loss of the child itself under any method of valuation, and distinguishable from other miscarriage cases in that they allow damages for mental anguish caused
by the loss of the child as well as damages for mental anguish caused by the mother's
physical trauma.
134. Comment, supra note 102, at 269.
135. 102 Mich. 624, 61 N.W. 11 (1894).
136. 102 Mich. at 629, 61 N.W. at 12.
137. 102 Mich. at 631, 61 N.W. at 12.
138. E.g., Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 243, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224-25 (1958).
139. See MICH. Cr. (Crv.) R. 505. In almost all situations the injury resulting in pre•
natal wrongful death would result in some separate harm to the mother compensable
as a miscarriage. Prenatal wrongful death might be the only possible action if the
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Yet even if the miscarriage action were to be expanded to allow
damages for the loss of the child, it would not be appropriate in all
fact situations,140 and it neglects the fact that some loss of companionship, if not all the pecuniary loss, is felt by the father as well. In the
present state of the law, the action for miscarriage does not give a
recovery for the loss of the child, and the prenatal wrongful death
action will at least partially fill this gap in the law.
Since most courts must turn to a wrongful death statute to give
recovery for the loss of the unborn child, the immediate issue becomes a matter of statutory construction, i.e., the statutory meaning
of "person." The Michigan wrongful death statute does not refer to
the wrongfully stillborn child, and the wording of the statute, not to
mention the ordinary use of the word "person" when the statute was
·written or even now, makes it unlikely that the legislators had this
problem in mind when the statute was first ,;vritten.141 The majority
in O'Neill does not meet this issue squarely. It does offer for consideration the guardian ad !item statute as evidence that the legislature in 1968 did recognize property rights in "unborn persons,''142
but the analogy from property law is particularly inapposite. Recognition of the unborn child as a "person" whose rights must be protected in litigation is an established part of the common law; in fact,
the guardian ad !item statute essentially parallels one originally
enacted in 1899 as part of the Probate Code, but limited to the
Probate Court.143 As noted above, the common law has always qualified its protection of property rights in the unborn with the requirement that they be born alive,144 precisely the requirement that the
court must escape in allowing an action for prenatal ,;vrongful death.
The "unborn child" in property law need not even be a biological
entity en ventre sa mere; he may be the yet unconceived beneficiary
of some future interest,145 but his property rights are not affected by
his lack of biological being. The specific statutory reference to "unborn persons" might even be indicative of the fact that when the
mother's suit is barred by contributory negligence. Such was the case in Mace v. Jung,
210 F. Supp. '706 (D. Alas. 1962), but the court rejected recovery for the wrongful death
of a nonviable fetus and did not reach the issue. In Nevada, a community property
state, contributory negligence of the father-beneficiary does not bar prenatal wrongful
death recovery by the mother. White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 52'7, 458 P.2d 61'7 (1969).
140. E.g., the obstetrical malpractice situation of Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, '72
S.2d 434 (1954). See note 125 supra.
141. 385 Mich. at 142-48, 188 N.W.2d at '790-94 (Black, J., dissenting).
142. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
143. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § '706.3 (West 1968). Cf. King. v. Emmons, 283 Mich.
116, 277 N.W. 851 (1938) (Probate Court guardian ad litem incompetent to bring action
in a court of general jurisdiction).
144. See text accompanying notes 43•51 supra.
145. Folk v. Hughes, 100 s.c. 220, 84 S.E. '713 (1915). See l AMERICAN LAW OF PROP•
ER.TY, supra note 47, § 4.8'7.
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legislature wants to refer to unborn persons, they make it explicit,
and thus that lack of such reference means unborn persons are to be
excluded.146
Other ways have been sought to circumvent this problem of
legislative intent. It was pointed out in Powers that since unborn
children may be beneficiaries under wrongful death acts by traditional property concepts,147 to deny the action would be to construe
"person" to include unborn persons when used to describe the beneficiary but not when used in the same act to refer to the decedent.148
This view, of course, requires that "person" for purposes of tort law
and property law be given the same meaning and assumes the conclusion. The Maryland supreme court could avoid the entire problem
of the meaning of "person" since the Maryland statute uses the words
"person" and "party" interchangeably to refer to the being whose
death is the subject of the action. 149 In the context of prenatal ·wrongful death, such constructions do not do violence to the legislative intent. The wrongful death act is remedial and should not be defeated
by strained interpretations.150 Its purpose is to compensate the survivors for their loss, and perhaps also to vindicate the life destroyed
by the defendant's wrongful act. A loss to the survivors was undoubtedly sustained, and O'Neill suggests that such a life was destroyed.
The biological approach provides a ready-made definition for "person" as it appears in the statute. The destruction of prenatal life is
encompassed' within the broad legislative language, and it is submitted that the statute covers death even though live birth is no
longer possible.
A question left undecided by O'Neill, however, is whether subsequent actions for prenatal wrongful death ·will be limited to the
precise facts of that case, which involved a viable infant, or whether
the case permits an action for the ·wrongful death of all unborn
persons, regardless of their stage of development. On the one hand,
O'Neill bases the action for wrongful death on the existence of a
common-law action for injury,151 and there is little doubt that on the
strength of Womack such a prenatal injury action will lie for injury
inflicted at any level of gestation. On the other hand, O'Neill emphasizes, as the biological approach requires it to do, that at the time
146. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 98, 268 P .2d 178, 180 (1954).
147. E.g., LaBlue v. Speck.er, 358 Mich. 558, 562-63, 100 N.W.2d 445, 447 (1960)
(dramshop act); Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1954);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Robertson, 82 Tex. 657, 17 S.W. 1041 (1891).
148. 380 Mich. at 194-95, 156 N.W.2d at 545 (T.M. Kavanagh, J., dissenting).
149. State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964), construing
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 1 (1957). MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 600.2922 (1968), set out in
part in note 1 supra, uses the same terminology, preserved in the amended version,
Pub. Act. No. 65, [1971] West's Mich. Legis. Serv. 111-12.
150. Van :Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937).
151. 385 Mich. at 134, 188 N.W.2d at 786.
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of the ·wrongful death of that infant, he was able to live independently,152 and notes that the complaint referred to the infant as
"viable.''153 In the current state of medicine, this is undoubtedly
true of the eight-month old fetus in O'Neill, but not of the fourmonth old fetus in Womack, 104 and thus there is some indication that
the court might still limit the ·wrongful death action to the viable
unborn child. This interpretation of the O'Neill decision is reinforced by the fact that all but one of the sixteen other courts allowing
recovery for prenatal wrongful death did so in cases involving a viable
fetus. 155 The single exception is Georgia, where recovery was permitted for an unborn child who was quick, but not yet viable.rno
While the viability distinction for prenatal wrongful death actions
is rarely an explicit holding,m it appears to be generally considered
an essential element in this type of action.108
The viability requirement was part of the original biological
justification for giving legal personality to the unborn, as enunciated
by Justice Bogg's dissent in Allaire.169 Since his opinion was largely
responsible for the continuing protest against the position of no recovery for prenatal injury, the viability requirement was retained,
at least by dicta, when recovery was at last allowed. 160 The issue was
felt to be not whether the child had lived after birth, but whether
152. 385 Mich. at 133-39, 188 N.W.2d at 786-88.
153. 385 Mich. at 132,188 N.W.2d at 785. See note 78 supra.
154. After about twenty-two weeks of pregnancy, a fetus may live for a few hours
after birth, but has virtually no chance of survival. The lungs are the last major organ
to develop sufficiently to sustain life. This usually occurs at about twenty-six weeks, and
a child born then has a chance to survive to adulthood. His chances of survival become
increasingly greater with each added week of uterine life, and after twenty-eight weeks
the child can be considered medically viable. See R. NESBrrr, PERINATAL Loss IN MODERN
OBSTETRICS 65 (1957); E. TAYLOR, BECK's OBsrErRICAL PRAcnCE 1-39 (8th ed. 1966),
Continued medical progress may create additional problems in defining independent
existence. See generally Brodie, supra note 43.
155. See authorities cited in note 65 supra.
156. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 716, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1955). But recovery
for prenatal injury is available for all unborn children in Georgia. Hornbuckle v.
Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
157. But see Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 612, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1964), which
distinguishes without overruling West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105. S.E. 88 (1956), which
held no cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable child.
158. Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alas. 1962), refused recovery for the wrong•
ful death of a nonviable fetus but indicated the result might have been different had
it been viable. See also Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965).
159. 184 Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640. Since the majority in Allaire had relied upon
Dietrich, which involved a nonviable fetus, by emphasizing viability Justice Boggs could
distinguish Dietrich on its facts as well as overcome the duty problem. 184 m. at 372-73,
56 N.E. at 642.
160. E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (dictum); Amann v.
Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 424, 114 N.E.2d 412, 414 (1953) (dictum). Poliquin v. MacDonald,
IOI N.H. 104, 107, 135 A.2d 249, 251 (1957), held that viability was required for all
prenatal torts; this decision was limited by Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147
A.2d 108, 110 (1958), which abandoned the viability requirement for prenatal injury.
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he was viable at the time of the injury that caused his harm or stillbirth.161 Since viability was thought to determine a legal personality
valid for all tort purposes, the effect was merely to use established
concepts of tort law in a situation where the inception of legal
personality had been moved back from birth to the time when the .
unborn child became viable. While claims for prenatal wrongful
death were being rejected by some courts on the ground that the
child was not born alive and therefore never became a person,162
other courts faced with children injured before viability who survived birth began to eliminate viability as a requirement.163 The
causation approach to prenatal injury was consistent with both these
developments, since it allowed recovery for tortious acts causing
harm to a fetus whenever injured, provided there was live birth, but
did not require finding the unborn child to be a person.164
The viability limitation is difficult to justify for either action.
It is naturally much easier to think of a fully developed child ready
to be born as a person than to impute the same quality to an embryo.165 This factor was undoubtedly involved in the early ·wrongful
death actions against attending physicians when the fully developed
child was ready to be born.166 But if birth itself is "merely a change
in the form of life,"167 the time when the fetus becomes viable is
even less of an event. Life is a continuum, and each prenatal event
builds on previous ones going back ultimately to conception. The
fetus, if left to develop normally, is a separate entity with an inherent
capacity for independent life168 and an increasing probability of survival. This development may be altered by his injury or cut off by his
death. In either case, there has been a loss, to the child directly if he
is injured and born, or to the family if he is killed. Not only has
161. E.g., Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1950). But see McKillip v.
Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971).
162. E.g., Keys v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 637, 155 N.E.2d 912, 915
(1960); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 97-98, 268 P.2d 178, 179-80 (1954). See
Del Tufo, supra note 109, at 74.
163. E.g., Daley v. Meier, 33 ru. App. 2d 218, 224, 178 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1961); Sinkler
v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273-74, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
367-58, 157 A.2d 497, 504-05 (1960); :Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d
108, 110 (1958).
164. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273-74, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Smith v. Brennan,
31 N.J. 353, 354-65, 157 A.2d 497,503 (1960).
165. See Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 505, 93 S.E.2d 727,
728, 729 (1956) (Duckworth, J., concurring); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ct.
App. Ky. 1955).
166. See note 66 supra and accompanying text. The first two prenatal injury actions
allowed in the United States were also malpractice actions: Bonbrest v. Kotz, fi5 F.
Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
167. 385 Mich. at 136, 188 N.W.2d at 787.
168. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953). See also
authorities cited in note 165 supra.
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viability nothing to do with the existence of the fetus, but practically
speaking it is impossible to determine the time when viability is
reached. 169 The date of conception itself cannot be determined with
certainty,17° and the rate at which the fetus develops is influenced by
the child's genetic heritage, its physical characteristics, the mother's
health, and other unique factors. 171 The unborn child's ability to
survive birth, the only sure determinant of viability, becomes a moot
point if in fact the child is stillborn through another's tort.
Experience ·with the viability criterion for prenatal injury actions
in other jurisdictions has led to its rejection as only frustrating the
policies served by personal injury law and precluding recovery for
some plaintiffs because of the fortuitous circumstance that they were
not viable at the time of the injury. 172 While the essential problems
of ·wrongful death are different, they too are frustrated if viability
is required. To the limited extent that the wrongful death action
actually vindicates the rights of the unborn, it makes no more sense
to hinge defendants' liability on viability than on birth. Even in
Michigan where the punitive nature of the ·wrongful death action is
rejected, the plain language of the statute requires the incorporation
of the common-law liability for injury as the basis for the liability for
death. 173 Although the legislature in 1848 could not have foreseen
all the changes in the common law, they surely knew that the common law was not static but subject to development by the courts. As
the court pointed out in O'Neill in the context of birth, "It would be
anomalous if we were to have two co-existing bodies of common law
tort liability ... one static and frozen ... for wrongful death and one
living and growing to apply in other cases."174
The viability distinction is rendered even less meaningful when
the purpose of wrongful death is viewed as that of giving recovery
for the loss suffered by decedent's survivors. Whether or not they
have suffered loss is unrelated to viability.175 Their difficulties of
proof will increase as the loss occurs earlier in pregnancy, but this
should not lead the court to say that such loss is nonexistent before
169. J. GREENHILL, supra note 79, at 7.
170. Conception is assumed to occur two weeks after the last normal menses. De•
cause of the difficulty of actually dating conception, plus differences in terminology
between lunar (28 day) and calendar (28-31 day) montbs, an "eight montbs baby" has
an age uncertainty that approaches one month. See generally J. GREENHILL, supra note
79, at3-5.
171. J. GREENHILL, supra note 79, at 7. The legal difficulties this uncertainty causes
were one reason for abandoning the requirement of viability in prenatal injury cases.
See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
172. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 368, 157 A.2d 497, 505 (196'0); Dennett v.
Hymers, 101 N.H. 483,486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958).
173. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
174. 385 Mich. at 134,188 N.W.2d at 786.
175. Del Tufo, supra note 109, at 78.
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the fetus becomes viable, any more than such loss is nonexistent before birth.
The retention of the viability distinction might serve several
practical purposes, however. There is now significant authority to the
effect that a viable unborn child is a person for the purposes of
,;vrongful death.176 It is undoubtedly easier to consider the viable
child as a person than to attribute the same quality to a fetus incapable of surviving birth, and hence it is easier in theory and in fact
to define "person" as it appears in the ,vrongful death acts to mean
"any viable human being, whether born or not." Since the '\VTongful
death action is statutory, courts are required to consider the specific
wording used by the legislature, and the viability distinction makes
for a more palatable "one step at a time" approach. But this reasoning should not hide the fact that if the legislators did not consciously
think about birth, they certainly did not think about viability as a
characteristic of the entity for whose death they created the action.
A second possible use of the viability distinction is to reconcile
the trend toward prenatal wrongful death recovery with the trend
toward abortion reform. While several states now allow abortion for
any fetus, regardless of age, upon approval of a panel of doctors,177
others permit the operation only up to a given fetal age,178 with the
implication that beyond that age the fetus is protected by law.179
Analogies to other areas of the law can be deceptive, and since tort
law, unlike criminal law, does not really protect the fetal right to
life, but rather compensates it for injury if born or its parents if not,
consistency with criminal and property law is not necessarily required. If identical treatment of the unborn is at all desirable, it
should at least be achieved in tort law, where the issue is the relation
of the killed or injured infant to a negligent tortfeasor, and the resulting harm to it or to the parents, rather than the quite different
legal relation of the fetus to the mother.
It is doubtful that either of the above rationales justifies limiting
recovery to the viable unborn child. On the other hand, such considerations suggest that it would not be unwise to seek an alternative
way to compensate for the stillbirth or miscarriage of a nonviable
fetus. The present advantage of a '\VTongful death action over a mis176. See cases cited in note 65 supra.
177. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-l, -5-3 (Supp. 1971); VA. CooE ANN. § 18-1-62.1
(Supp. 1971).
178. E.g., CAL. HEALTH&: SAFETY CODE § 25953 (West Supp. 1971) (20 weeks); 1970
SESS. LA.ws HAWAII, Acr 1, § 2(3)(b) ("viability"); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971) (24 weeks).
179. In response to Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 481 (1970), discussed in note 55 supra, California legislators inferred that abortion
outside the bounds of their therapeutic statute (note 178 supra) constituted feticide.
See Comment, supra note 55. They enacted this interpretation into a criminal statute.
Assembly Bill 816, 1970 Reg. Sess. (codified in CAL. PENAL CoDE § 187 (West Supp. 1971).
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carriage action is that the former compensates in some measure for
the loss of the child-a real loss suffered by the family. This naturally
gives plaintiffs an incentive to use this action in addition to the
action for miscarriage. The difficulties in proof will limit the number
of actions brought when the strict pecuniary loss standard is followed.
Where companionship is an element of damages, plaintiffs' somewhat easier burden of proof will be balanced with the relative difference in the effects on the family between the fetus felt to be alive
and the mere knowledge of pregnancy. The unborn child does have
a value to its parents, and its loss should be compensated. I£ the
biological theory behind wrongful death will not suffice to allow
the action for a nonviable fetus, recovery should at least be given
in the miscarriage action, allowing the same damages for loss of
society and companionship as provided in the amended Michigan
wrongful death statute. In either case, O'Neill should serve as precedent for recovery for the death of an unborn child in any stage
of development.

